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Breaking the Fence: Can Patent Rights
Deter Biomedical Innovation in
‘Technology Followers’?
PADMASHREE GEHL SAMPATH
United Nations University – MERIT, Maastricht, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT The impact of patent protection on biomedical innovation has been a controversial
issue. Although a ‘medical anti-commons’ has been predicted as a result of a proliferation of patents
on upstream technologies, evidence to test these concerns is only now emerging. However, most
industrial surveys that shed light on this issue are mainly from developed countries, making it very
difficult to predict the impact of patenting on biomedical innovation in developing and least developed
countries. This paper develops a framework of analysis for the impact of patent rights on biomedical
innovation in ‘technology follower’ developing countries. Based on the framework developed in the
paper, empirical data collected in an industry-level survey of the Indian pharmaceutical industry
between November 2004 and January 2005 is used to analyze the impact of patent rights as recognized
under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) on
biomedical innovation in technology followers.
KEY WORDS:
1. Introduction
Firms rely on a variety of appropriability mechanisms to protect their innovations, such
as secrecy and first mover advantages, which are often more important than patents.1
But the choice of appropriability mechanisms depends very much on the sector and in
the pharmaceutical sector; patents are a very important instrument for the protection of
innovations.2 Over time, stronger patent regimes, newer technologies such as biotechnol-
ogy and changing industrial structures have contributed to an increased proliferation of
patents in the biomedical sector.3
Therefore, not surprisingly, the issue how intellectual property protection as contained
in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS
Agreement) will impact biomedical innovation is a controversial one, with claims in either
direction. A medical ‘anti-commons’was predicted following a dramatic increase in patent-
ing activity especially in the pharmaceutical and biotechnological sectors in the early 1990s.4
It has been argued that present levels of intellectual property protection lead to too many
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2 P. G. Sampath
patent rights on upstream discoveries in biomedical research and have the potential to sti-
fle downstream discoveries and product development by increasing transaction costs and
magnifying the risk of failures.5 According to scholars, this problem is worsened by patent
scope issues that grant too broad claims to early innovators, thereby making it necessary
on subsequent innovators to procure licenses on research tools or earlier innovations to
conduct R&D, or even limit them from fully capturing the gains of their innovations.6 The
World Health Organization has classified these detrimental impacts of patents on access to
research tools7 in the biomedical sector into three major categories: increasing the costs of
available services, imposing transaction costs and inconveniences on R&D and impeding
the transfer of existing tools and technologies.8
Whether intellectual property rights (hereafter, IPRs) create an anti-commons or lead
to restricted access to research tools is a highly complex question. This not only involves
considerations of broader patent scope and its impact on innovation, but also, effects of
IPRs (as we have them now) on stimulating R&D, bargaining anomalies that may result
from monopolistic positions, information issues and transaction costs,9 and most impor-
tantly, social costs imposed by grant of such a patents regime – that is, whether there are
innovation projects under this regime that were not undertaken owing to IPR issues under
a TRIPS-compliant regime, and if so, do the other benefits of granting such IPRs offset
these costs/losses? Many of these issues have been dealt with in the literature on the topic,
but mainly from a developed country perspective and in a framework that predominantly
considers the needs and characteristics of biomedical innovation in developed countries.
The evidence to test the relationship between patents and biomedical innovation, although
scanty, is also only available from select developed countries.
Although it has been clearly acknowledged that there is a need to look at the implications
of the TRIPS Agreement on innovation and development, a coherent framework to do so is
yet to emerge. The implications of a global IPR framework such as the TRIPS Agreement
may be varied for countries at different stages of development, and this may have the effect
of separating the countries across regions (North vs South in the most basic sense), and also
affect the process of catching up.10 In this context, this paper argues that this topic assumes
at least as much importance if not more, in technology follower developing countries that are
trying to/have been able to develop significant local innovative capacity in the biomedical
sector. Specifically, what may look like a benign hindrance in the case of developed countries
with significantly advanced biomedical sectors may in fact turn out to be a major deterrent
in the case of a technology follower country where firms routinely experience difficulties
in building technological capabilities in biomedical sciences. Other differences in the local
innovation context may also have an impact on how IPRs on biomedical products affect
innovation trends. Mainly because of this, the paper also considers the issues in terms of
technology follower countries, rather than technology follower firms, although the results
may be equally applicable to technology follower firms in developed countries as well.
Three main issues seem to be of utmost importance for technology follower countries:
(a) Can accumulated IPR positions by firms in developed countries that have a lead tech-
nological advantage be used to prevent serious competition from industries in developing
countries in innovative activities at the frontier? (b) What sort of bargaining anomalies
could result from monopolistic positions, information issues and transaction costs when
one talks of licensing arrangements between firms across the globe? (c) How important are
the restrictions placed by such IPRs when compared to other factors that affect firm-level
decisions on taking up new innovation projects?
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This paper seeks to make a contribution towards analyzing the impact of patent protection
on biomedical innovation in developing countries in two ways – by identifying the main
issues that call for a separate framework for assessing the impact of intellectual property
rights on biomedical innovation in these countries, and by presenting evidence from the
Indian pharmaceutical industry on this issue. Based on empirical data that was collected in
2004–2005 as part of a firm level survey of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, the paper
seeks to draw robust conclusions on the impact of patents when compared to other factors
that impede/facilitate innovative capabilities in the biomedical sector.
For purposes of this paper, the term ‘technology followers’ refers to developing coun-
tries with newly industrializing sectors where the technological frontiers do not represent
the ‘state-of-the-art’ technology in the field.11 As against a static definition of ‘technol-
ogy followers’, the definition considered in this paper is more dynamic and assumes that
whereas the newly industrializing sector as a whole may not be involved in ‘state-of-the-
art’ innovation; individual firms therein are capable of offering competition in innovative
activities at the global technological frontier. Innovation is defined from the view point of
the firm, to essentially comprise of the practice and production of all product and process
technologies that are new to them and their context and not necessarily to the universe.12
All activities at the firm level that enhance learning skills, expand the knowledge base and
increase competitiveness both locally and globally, are innovative activities. R&D is one
form of knowledge production, but such a definition includes also all other forms of activi-
ties through which firms access knowledge and technologies in order to progress along the
learning curve. Thus, any sector at any given point of time has firms ranging between those
that perform innovative activities at the global frontier, to others that are innovating not at
the frontier, but are involved in a constant, dynamic process of technological learning to
move to the frontier. Biomedical innovation is defined as pharmaceutical innovation that
has integrated modern biotechnological processes into its domain, whether for research or
the development of products.13 Research tools are defined as ‘any tangible or informational
input into the process of discovering a drug or any other medical therapy or method of diag-
nosing a disease’.14 In the analysis, newer innovation projects are taken as opportunities of
building innovative capabilities. From a dynamic perspective, the more a firm is compelled
to abandon useful innovation projects because of IPR restrictions, the larger the probability
that the expansion of its technological capabilities are restricted.
2. Intellectual Property Rights and Biomedical Innovation in Developing
Countries: A Framework for Analysis
In neoclassical economics, patents are a solution for the market failure caused by the non-
excludability and non-rivaled nature of information as a good.15 Traditionally, the static Q1
costs of patents on competition and diffusion of information are off-set by their dynamic
impact on incentives to innovate. Hence, design of optimal patent regimes comprises an
assessment of the links between patent characteristics (patent length and patent scope), firm
profits, and incentives to innovate.16 Simply put, one can assume that the longer the patent
life, the greater the expected rents and the broader the patent scope, the greater the market
power that is conferred on the patent holder.17 Patent breadth/scope, however, is defined
as ‘how similar other innovations can be without infringing the original patent’.18 Patent
scope determines the strength of protection granted and therefore also the extent of power
vested in the patent holder to limit competition. Restricting the scope of protection has
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therefore been seen as a way of balancing the static costs of intellectual property protection
as against the dynamic gains of encouraging innovative activity.19 Similarly, diffusion of
useful information that forms the basis of the patent is to be achieved by placing certain
limitations on patent height (level of disclosure required in a patent application for the grant
of a patent) within patent regimes.
2.1. Motives for Patenting
Recent evidence generated by industry surveys reveals that as against the market failure
argument postulated by neoclassical economics for grant of patents, a variety of strategic
motives prompt the use of patents as an appropriability mechanism by firms today. These
‘strategic motives’ include the use of patents as negotiating levers, tools for prevention
of infringement suits or block innovations from competitors, to capture extra value for
innovative efforts, among others. Excess market power accumulated through patents is used
by firms to control diffusion of inventions and research results20 and/or to cover entire areas
of research or preserve market shares by accumulating ‘sleeping patents’ that help capture
extra value for innovative efforts.21 A comparative survey of the manufacturing sectors in
USA and Japan22 found strategic uses of patents to be common in the manufacturing sectors
in both countries, with a higher prevalence of the same in Japan.23 The electronics industry
is also a fertile example of strategic patenting.24
In biomedical innovation too, patents are used for a variety of strategic reasons. Thumm
notes from the results of a survey of the Swiss biotechnology industry that apart from pro-
tecting one’s own technology from imitation, the second most prominent motive of firms
to apply for a patent was to prevent competitors’ patenting and application activities.25 The
survey also found that the fourth most prominent motive to patent was to improve the firm’s
situation in R&D cooperation.26 Strategic use of patenting by firms is encouraged by patent
policies that lay an emphasis on enhanced patenting activity in the biomedical sector and also
grant increased patent scope (and encourage broader claims), thereby leading to a situation
where there are more patents per products/technology. This creates scope for proliferation
of patents on upstream discoveries that can have the effect of stifling newer innovations. In
one of the first papers on this topic, Heller and Eisenberg made the point that the greater the
number of patent holders that need to be brought into agreement for any downstream dis-
covery to proceed, the greater the risk that bargaining anomalies caused by transaction cost
issues will prevent this from happening, thereby causing a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’.27
Up until now, concerns raised in the IPRs-biomedical innovation nexus have mainly
been prompted by several characteristics of biomedical innovation in developed countries.
Legislative initiatives such as the American Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 meant to encourage
patenting in academic research have not only expanded the kinds of institutions that claim
patent rights on biomedical innovations, but also encouraged the patenting of early-stage
discoveries that result from publicly-funded research and are considerably removed from
final product development.28 The emergence of biotechnology start-ups have blurred the
boundaries between academic research and commercial entrepreneurship, and at the same
time, expanded the limits of patenting in biomedical research even further. The predomi-
nance of private research over public-funded research in biosciences is yet another factor
that has led to a larger amount of research results being covered by proprietary claims.29
Therefore, IPRs might not only hinder firm–firm interactions, but also firm–academia or
even academia–academia interactions in biomedical research.30
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2.2. Bargaining and transaction cost issues
Biomedical innovation is characterized by the flow of ideas, skills and research tools between
universities, research institutes and the private sector and transaction costs arise due to insti-
tutional heterogeneity and conflicting agendas of the different agents, difficulties in valuation
of tools and associated information and increased litigation.31 Information asymmetries on
the value of patented tools as research inputs cause difficulties in evaluation and lead to
undue expectation of rents from the transaction.32 More generally, research tool users feel
that the provider is asking for too much in return for access to a patented product based on
an over-valuation of the contribution of the tool relative to other inputs for future valuable
discoveries. Such factors create situations that increase costs of bargaining for research
tools and hinder meaningful exchange; and rather seem to point out to how patents can be
used strategically to block research.33 As Cohen et al. appropriately note: ‘Patents become
weapons in mutually reinforcing, non-cooperative strategic interactions where firms feel
increasingly compelled to patent either because they need to protect themselves from suits
or from being blocked, or they want to block rivals or use patents as bargaining chips
in negotiations’.34 The transaction costs of patents on research tools can go well beyond
bargaining, into specific forms of commercialization hurdles.35 Patent thickets and royalty
stacking often occur, and discourage subsequent innovators – the larger number of licenses
that have clauses on royalty sharing on the final product, the lesser the revenue for the
innovator.36
Up until now, major cases where patents have blocked subsequent innovation and attracted
public attention have not arisen in the biomedical sector,37 but is the lack of a ‘block buster’
case pointing out to the absence of such behavior in the biomedical sector? Limited evi-
dence that tests these concerns is available from USA, Switzerland and Germany. Walsh
et al. conducted a survey of the biomedical sector in the USA, an interview method with
70 respondents supplemented mainly by archival data, which tried to test whether an ‘anti-
commons’ can really be observed in the USA, and whether patent rights in the biomedical
sector hinder innovation.38 The study concludes that although problems of transaction costs,
restricted access to research tools and royalty stacking exist, there is no real ‘anti-commons’
in biomedical research since parties are able to deal with these issues and ‘. . . IP on research
tools, although sometimes impeding marginal projects, rarely precludes the pursuit of more
promising ones’. The study underscores the importance of working solutions – like infringe-
ment, research exemptions, inventing around and invalidating patents in courts – in reducing
the risks associated with the creation of an ‘anti-commons’ due to intellectual property
protection on research tools. A German survey conducted on the issue comprised of 25
respondents and also uses a similar interview method.39 This survey concluded that although
royalty stacking is a real problem, research agreements are not usually hampered by the
presence of intellectual property in the German biopharmaceutical sector, and working
solutions and court resolution of disputes are common. Another common conclusion in
both these studies was that firms in both countries admitted to avoiding taking on research
projects where there are too many patents on research tools.40
2.3. Is there a Need for a Separate Framework for Developing Countries?
In which ways are the problems discussed in the previous sub-section different or more
severe when one tries to assess the case of firms in technology follower countries? There
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seem to be four main reasons that call for a differential framework to analyze the impact of
intellectual property on biomedical innovation in technology follower developing countries,
and require that an analysis on the impact of IPRs on biomedical innovation be necessarily
conducted from an ex-ante decision-making perspective.
The first and most persuasive reason for a differential framework comes from the nature
of innovation and the catch-up process itself. Catch up experiences of the present developed
countries can be categorized into three stylized sets of observations:41 (i) access to knowl-
edge (of which access to technologies is a part of) and generation of knowledge locally
have played a key role in economic development since the 18th century42 and both usually
depend on the capacity of domestic institutions for innovation; (ii) innovation is continu-
ously encouraged by wide accessibility of already produced knowledge to society at low
costs;43 and (iii) intellectual property has been a very important institutional mechanism his-
torically in enabling both access to existing knowledge and generation of new knowledge.Q2
It was used to achieve diffusion of innovations in local environments, without restrictions
on reverse engineering and copying. This led to learning about the use of the innovation in
different contexts, which in turn stimulated feedback improvements. Thus, most of today’s
state-of-the-art innovator countries passed through a spectrum of capability construction
that is highly contested in intellectual property debates: reverse-engineering to incremental
and feedback innovation to frontier innovations. In this context, can accumulated IPR posi-
tions by firms in developed countries that have a lead technological advantage be used to
prevent serious competition from industries in technology follower countries in innovative
activities at the frontier?
Even if this is not completely the case, given the oligopolistic market structure in global
biomedical innovation and the widespread use of patents by firms for strategic reasons, is
meaningful exchange hindered by the fact that firms on both sides do not have IP assets
to trade that interest them mutually, in quid pro quo relationships? Even if there is a small
chance that this could be true, its implications for global welfare need to be analyzed. In
this context, the World Health Organization has warned against the fact that implications
of patents on research tools may be much more drastic in technology follower countries:
in addition to imposing transaction costs on research (of the kinds that can be resolved
through ‘working solutions’ of various kinds), they can impede the transfer of existing tools
and technologies completely.44 Such an impediment to the transfer of existing tools and
technologies to technology follower countries can prevent the development of innovative
capabilities including knowledge-bases in the biomedical sector.45 This problem is in many
ways synonymous with the access to medicines problem that paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is seeking to resolve.46 However,
the impact of this issue is only just being felt and it may take some time until it mobilizes
attention.Q3
Second, the transaction costs that hinder the formation of efficient contracts in biomed-
ical innovation can broadly be classified as search and information costs and bargaining
and decision-making costs. Search and information costs refer to the set of costs that one
incurs in order to obtain information on the various ways to conduct a transaction and to
find the right set of partners in order to conduct the transaction. It also includes costs of
getting informed about the contingencies that may materialize in the course of the con-
tract. Similarly, bargaining and decision making costs refer to the costs of negotiating and
reaching an agreement on the most important clauses of the contract. Usually, anticipating
all contingencies and incorporating them into a contractual framework also entails costs.47
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Negotiating access to technologies for firms in technology follower countries with firms
who hold patents to these tools in developed countries will necessarily entail higher trans-
action costs related to both search and information, and negotiation and bargaining due
to international nature of these transactions. Firms in technology follower countries could
face bargaining anomalies that could result from monopolistic positions, information issues
and transaction costs generated by the need to conclude licensing arrangements between
firms/research institutes and universities across the globe.Additional market imperfections,
caused by the fact that firms in technology follower countries operate in a context where
legal uncertainty is widespread, often in terms of a lack of laws or institutional capacity to
enforce corporate or intellectual property transactions, effectively calls into question ‘work-
ing solutions’ such as infringements and invalidating patents in courts.48 The absence of
well functioning legal frameworks impacts upon their ability to invoke effective working
solutions to overcome transaction cost hurdles in securing access to technologies, which
according to the US study on the issue is a very important resort among US firms in solving
such problems.49
Third, what are the social costs of such an IPRs regime? Will a project be undertaken
ex-ante even under the present IPRs regime? If patenting is excessive under this regime,
then are its social costs offset by the diffusion of information through patents or through
reduced incentives to litigate?50 How would negotiation proceed without intellectual prop-
erty protection and how does IPRs protection change bargaining thresholds of parties? That
is, do we have more or less the same number of projects under alternate IPR regimes, all
other things being constant? If not, how important are IPRs restrictions, when compared to
other factors that affect firm-level decisions on taking up new innovation projects?
Another more general but important set of issues is raised by the nuanced relationship
between patent policies and institutions, and the diffusion of knowledge and competition
in different environments.51 It is not only widely acknowledged now that the impact of
patents on diffusion of information, inhibiting competition and promoting innovation is
sector and context-specific but also that habits and practices of actors innovation systems
can hinder/help leverage these effects.52
Several observations made in the US and German surveys support the need for a different
framework for technology follower countries that looks deeper into these questions. The
US survey itself, in several places, infers that the problems of royalty stacking, costs and
delays in licensing owing to IP protection and upstream discover patents may be much
more acute and even prohibitive for smaller firms with limited budgets. It is very likely Q4
that firms in other countries, especially developing countries, are more affected. These
authors also conclude that the problem of intellectual property holders being able to limit
access to upstream discoveries and promising research targets was generally considered to
be manageable because if the research tool was critical, the interviewed firms would buy
access to it.53 Even if one accepts this observation, the extent to which this will hold for
firms/research institutes in technology follower developing countries will depend on their
ability to ‘buy’ access to important research tools. The emphasis on ‘working solutions’
to deal with these problems in the US and German surveys also calls for a more rigorous
assessment of this issue on a larger scale, once again with a special emphasis on technology
follower countries. Specifically, what will happen when a particular national legal regime
does not provide for the same or similar ‘working solutions’ to be negotiated between
parties in an efficient way? A final point that stands out is: ‘what will be the implications
for building innovative capabilities in firms in technology follower countries if they cannot
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pursue research projects in areas where there are already too many patents on research
tools?’
3. Biomedical Innovation in India: The Case of a Technology Follower
India is often cited as a prime example of an ‘innovative developing country’54 and offers a
good case to analyze the impact of stronger patent rights on biomedical innovation. India has
a thriving pharmaceutical sector with an expanding biotechnological base and is presently
transitioning from a weaker IPR regime that promoted incremental and imitative innovation
to a TRIPS compliant IPR regime. The remaining sections of this paper use empirical data
to test the impact of patents on biomedical innovation in India. To answer the question: ‘will
a project be undertaken ex-ante even under the present IPRs regime?’, this paper considers
the earlier Indian IPR regime as a weaker alternative to the one presently prescribed by the
TRIPS Agreement, in order to assess the impact of the TRIPS-compliant IPRs regime on
choices of firms to pursue specific innovation portfolios, and its resulting impact on building
innovative capabilities in biomedical sciences.
3.1. Innovation in Indian Pharmaceutical Biotechnology and the Impact of Patent
Compliance
The Indian pharmaceutical sector is among the largest within developing countries, account-
ing for 8% of the global output in terms of volume and ranking 13th in terms of value in
2004.55 The sale of retail formulations in the domestic market reached an estimated US$4.3
billion in the fiscal year 2003 and was dominated by Indian companies that held a market
share of 75%.56 Its major strengths include: a cost-competitive manufacturing base that
extends to clinical studies, extensive skills in chemistry and process development, ability to
manufacture over 50% of the bulk drugs needed for its pharmaceutical production activities
locally, the emergence of a promising biotechnology industry, availability of local scientists
and R&D personnel of a high scientific quality and a wide network of R&D.57
Indian compliance with the TRIPS Agreement has proceeded in several stages up until
now.The Patents (Amendment)Act, 1999 introduced the mail box system and set up a system
of exclusive market rights (hereafter, EMRs) to be retrospective from 1 January 1995 in
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. The Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002, introduced 64
changes to the Patent Act of 1970, the most important ones of these being the extension
of patent term from 14 to 20 years, and the reversal of burden of proof from patent holder
to alleged infringer.58 The final set of changes to make India’s patent regime comply with
the TRIPS Agreement in toto were first contained in the Indian Patent Ordinance of 2004,
that has now been replaced by the Indian Patent (Amendments) Act of 2005. The Indian
Patent (Amendments) Act, 2005, seeks to complete India’s full-scale compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement. The Act has the effect of invalidating Section 5 of the Indian Patent
Act, which granted only process patents for food, medicines and other drug substances, in
order to make product patent protection of pharmaceuticals possible under Indian law. As
a result, reverse engineering possibilities available to the pharmaceutical industry will only
be limited to those drugs that are off-patent.
Section 47 of the original Patents Act of 1970 contains a research exemption for patented
inventions (see Section 47 (3)). This section, which can be interpreted as applicable for both
academic and commercial research, has been left unmodified by all subsequent amendments
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to the patent regime, but two major changes introduced in the Amendments of 2002 affect
the patenting of research tools for biomedical and biotechnological inventions in India. The
Patent Act has extended the scope of patentable inventions to a method or process of testing
during the process of manufacture, including those in biochemical, biotechnological and
microbiological areas.59 Section 3 of the Patent Act that deals with inventions that are not
patentable was amended in 2002 to include any process for the diagnostic or therapeutic
treatment of human beings or for a similar treatment of animals or plants (see Section 3(i)).
As a result of these provisions, biomedical research tools are patentable under Indian
patent law. There are two exceptions to this. First, there is a research exemption for patented
inventions (Section 47 (3) of the original Act), which can be interpreted to be applicable for
both academic and commercial research, because the section contains no specific caveats.
Second, medical, diagnostic and therapeutic kits/tools are not patentable when they are for
the treatment of human beings or animals or plants.
3.2. Methodology and Variables
The empirical analysis is based on data collected during an industry survey of 103 phar-
maceutical firms in India, between October 2004 and January 2005. The survey design was
guided by a background country report of the Indian pharmaceutical sector, after which a
range of semi-structured interviews with experts in the area of pharmaceutical innovation
and intellectual property rights were conducted as the second step in order to help clar-
ify the structure and content of the survey and to provide content validation to the survey
questionnaire. The questionnaire was then administered to 103 firms ranked using data on
export potential, R&D investments and annual sales from online databases on the Indian
pharmaceutical sector, such as the India Infoline and Pharmabiz.
One of the key contributions of the survey results to analyzing emerging issues related
to patent protection for pharmaceutical innovation and access to medicines in the Indian
context is a categorization of firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector into three main
groups. This categorization, which was achieved on the basis of the empirical data collected,
is very helpful in analyzing emerging firm strategies and their implications in detail. The first
group of firms (hereafter, group 1) comprises large-scale pharmaceutical firms that are both
subsidiaries of MNCs in India or wholly-owned Indian firms. The second group of firms
(hereafter, group 2) comprises either generic manufacturers whose ability to do product
development is limited or niche players who rely on innovative strengths to survive through
activities such as contract research. The third and final group of companies (hereafter, group
3) are very small companies who mainly produce generic drugs for bigger Indian companies,
both local and MNCs.60 These three groups are representative of the Indian pharmaceutical
sector, which amounts to approximately 6000 firms in total, engaged in the production
of both bulk drugs and formulations.61 Because this categorization is corroborated by their
export potential, ability to invest in innovative activities and annual turnover, it helps pinpoint
the extreme variance in industry structure because it embodies the vast differences among
firms in terms of firm size, employment capacity, innovation potential, R&D investments
and exports. The differences condition strategies for innovation and business, and have
implications for access to medicines in depth.62
Out of the 103 firms surveyed as part of the empirical investigation, 31 belonged to group
1, 27 to group 2 and 44 to group 3. Data was collected over a period between 2000 and
2004, in order to be able to assess emerging constraints, firm strategies and the impact of
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patenting over time. In addition to interviewing a cross-section of firms that participated
in the survey, several other firms that were not part of the questionnaire survey were also
interviewed during field work especially in the biotechnology sector to understand their
main concerns and experiences on patent issues. The key informants consulted during field
work were the Heads of Marketing and the Heads of R&D in each firm. Wherever the firms
had their own intellectual property divisions, the heads of the intellectual property division
were also interviewed.
4. Main Findings
The survey focused on several aspects of access to technologies for biomedical innovation
in India. Among these, it addressed the question whether access to new technologies has
become more difficult for firms since India began its phased out compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement in 2002. Firms were asked to rank reasons for the increasing difficulties to access
new technologies. Firms were also asked whether they have abandoned innovation projects
because of IPR restrictions; and those that abandoned projects were asked to provide details.
In the analysis, newer innovation projects represent opportunities for building innovative
capabilities in the biomedical sector. Therefore, from a dynamic perspective, the larger
number of useful innovation projects a firm has had to abandon owing to IPR restrictions, the
larger the probability that the expansion of its technological capabilities has been restricted.
4.1. Descriptive Results
Will India’s full-scale TRIPS compliance result in restricted access to technologies to the
local pharmaceutical industry? To test this proposition, the survey posed the question
whether firms face increased difficulties in accessing new technologies that are required
for their activities after India started its phased compliance with the TRIPS Agreement over
the past few years. A total of 43 firms felt that access to new technologies have become
more difficult after India started implementing its compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
Of these, 12 belonged to group 1, 11 belonged to group 2 and 20 to group 3. Of the 43 firms
that did face difficulties in accessing new technologies after India began complying with
the TRIPS Agreement, only 28 firms admitted to having abandoned innovation projects
because of patent protection. Of these, 11 belonged to group 1, 7 to group 2 and 10 to group
3 (see Table 1). Interviews with firm executives revealed that projects were abandoned
mainly because (a) firms faced difficulties in terms of high costs for licensing and (b) firms
Table 1. Impact of TRIPS agreement on access to technologies
More difficult access to technologies Abandoned innovation projects
Total no. of because of TRIPS due to IPR restrictions
Firm firms ingroup group Number Percentage Number Percentage
1 31 12 39% (12/31) 11 35% (11/31)
2 27 11 41% (11/27) 7 26% (7/27)
3 44 20 45% (20/44) 10 23% (10/44)
Total N = 102 N = 43 100% N = 28 100%
Source: WHO-INTECH survey conducted by author, 2005.
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Table 2. Reasons for difficulties in accessing new technologies after India’s TRIPS compliance
Too many
patents on Restricted Royalty
research inputs access due to stacking in
Firm needed for contractual licensing High licensing
group/Effect innovation difficulties contracts fees
1 3.17 (12) 3.33 (12) 2.33 (12) 3.33 (12)
2 3.91 (11) 3.64 (11) 2.55 (11) 3.91 (11)
3 3.35 (20) 3.55 (20) 2.79 (19) 3.58 (19)
Average mean/firm
total
3.44 (43) 3.51 (43) 2.60 (42) 3.60 (42)
Note: The rating is the mean score for each group of firms, with 1 = weakest and 5 = strongest, any rating above
2.5 is an important constraint. The figures in parentheses represent the number of firms.
Source: WHO-INTECH field survey conducted by author, 2005.
realized ex-post that the results of their innovation projects would infringe patents filed for
by competitors on the same compounds/processes (interviews).
The survey also asked the firms to identify factors responsible for difficulties in accessing
new technologies. The respondents were asked to assign a score to each one of the reasons
contained in Table 2 from 1 (weakest) to 5 (strongest). As Table 2 shows, all reasons
from significant to very significant (above 2.5), with royalty stacking being a reason that
is relatively less important than multiple patents, restricted access owing to contractual
difficulties and high licensing fees. Furthermore, the survey response to this question also
shows that group 2 firms are much more sensitive to the increasing number of patents,
restricted access and the high licensing fees involved in carrying out incremental innovations
as a result of India’s TRIPS compliance.
4.2. The Model
These findings, albeit indicative of the relationship between access to technology issues
and the likelihood of abandoning innovation projects, are merely descriptive. An empirical
model that explains the probability of firms’ decisions to abandon innovation projects was
constructed using probit technique. The definition of variables is contained in Table 3.
The model is described as follows:
d∗i = β ′xi + εi, i = 1, . . . , N (1)
and
di =
{
1 if d∗i > 0
0 if d∗i ≤ 0
(2)
The latent (unobserved) variable d∗i captures economic or strategic reasons of firm i to
abandon innovation which is a function of observed explanatory variables xi and other
unobserved factors that are summarized in i . If the economic reasons cross a certain
threshold d∗i > 0, di is observed to be 1, meaning that firm i has abandoned innovation
projects, otherwise it is observed to be 0 meaning that the firm has continued to perform
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Table 3. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Gvt. Subsid 2000–2004 Indicator with value 1 if a firm receives any government
assistance over the period 2000–2004
Employment in 2004 Total employment in 2004 expressed in full time equivalent
(fte); a log transformation is used in the regressions
R&D intensity in 2004 The share in total sales of R&D expenditures in 2004; a log
transformation is used in the regressions
Past continuous R&D performance Indicator with value 1 if a firm has positive R&D
expenditures over the period 2000–2003
Past occasional R&D performance Indicator with value 1 if a firm has positive R&D
expenditures in any year between 2000–2003
Product innovators Indicator with value 1 if a firm has carried out new product
development
Process innovators Indicator with value 1 if a firm has carried out new process
development
Exporting firms Indicator with value 1 if a firm exports
Technology licensing Indicator with value 1 if innovation source from technology
licensing is fairly strong, strong or very strong
Joint venture R&D Indicator with value 1 if innovation source from joint venture
R&D is fairly strong, strong or very strong
Hiring skilled employees Indicator with value 1 if innovation source from hiring
skilled workers is fairly strong, strong or very strong
Royalty stacking Indicator with value 1 if royalty stacking is deemed to
be fairly strong, strong or very strong reason of IPR
restriction
Proliferation of patents Indicator with value 1 if proliferation of patents on inputs
needed is deemed to be a fairly strong, strong or very
strong reason of IPR restriction
Restricted access to technology Indicator with value 1 if restricted access to upstream
technology is deemed to be a fairly strong, strong or very
strong reason of IPR restriction
Very high licensing fees Indicator with value 1 if very high licensing fees are deemed
to be a fairly strong, strong or very strong reason of IPR
restriction
Total sales in 2004 Total sales in 2004; the log-transformed variable is included
in the regressions
Financial constraint Indicator with value 1 if financial support is deemed to be a
fairly severe, severe or very severe constraint to deal with
new IPR challenges
Firms in cluster 1 Indicator with value 1 if it belongs to cluster 1
Firms in cluster 2 Indicator with value 1 if it belongs to cluster 2
Firms in cluster 3 Indicator with value 1 if it belongs to cluster 3
innovation projects. To estimate the model as described in equations (1) and (2), we assume
the errors i to be identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) standard normal. The
loglikelihood function is derived as:
ln L =
N∑
i=1
ln [(2di − 1)β ′xi], (3)
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where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The probit model is
estimated by including into the vector xi all the variables of Table 3, but R&D inten-
sity as regressors, which results in the general model. The effort to remove the explanatory
variables that are not significant results in the restricted model. This latter model is tested
against the more general one using a likelihood ratio test where the null hypothesis is that of
the joint nonsignificance of these explanatory variables. With a x2(13) = 10.98 and a p-value
of 0.612, the null hypothesis is not rejected at any standard significance level thereby lead-
ing us to reject the general model in favor of the restricted one. The results of this model
are as shown in Table 4 below.
The term ‘innovation projects’ is construed in the model to be in accordance with the
discussion in Sections 1 and 2 of the paper. All projects using those firms that are seeking to
expand their innovative activities in ways that enhance their learning skills, expand knowl-
edge base and increase competitiveness both locally and globally, are termed innovative
projects. This includes R&D but also includes all other forms of activities through which
firms access knowledge and technologies in order to progress along the learning curve.
All the 103 firms that participated in the survey are seeking to enhance their innovative
capacities to scale up the global innovation frontier.63
Table 4. Probit ML estimates of the probability of abandoning innovation projects and
likelihood ratio test
Coefficient (Std. Err.) Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Variable General model Restricted model
Gvt. Subsid 2000–2004 1.158∗∗ (0.395) 1.067∗∗ (0.352)
Employment in 2004 (in log) −0.770∗ (0.327) −0.462† (0.237)
Past continuous R&D perf. −0.365 (0.447) – –
Past occasional R&D perf. −0.308 (0.519) – –
Product innovators 0.785 (0.490) – –
Process innovators −0.890† (0.457) −0.650∗ (0.315)
Exporting firms 0.039 (0.437) – –
Technology licensing −0.053 (0.365) – –
Joint venture R&D 0.375 (0.387) – –
Hiring skilled employees −0.310 (0.440) – –
Royalty stacking 0.219 (0.553) – –
Proliferation of patents −0.997 (0.926) – –
Restricted access to tech. 0.874 (0.610) 1.006∗∗ (0.303)
Very high licensing fees 1.126 (1.090) – –
Total sales in 2004 (in log) 0.092 (0.309) 0.393∗ (0.191)
Financial constraint −0.321 (0.629) – –
Firms in cluster 1 1.637† (0.863) – –
Firms in cluster 2 0.250 (0.560) – –
Intercept 3.128† (1.751) 0.227 (0.978)
Number of firms 103
Log-likelihood −41.552 −47.044
Likelihood ratio test x2
(13) = 10.98, p-value = 0.612
Significance levels: †10%; ∗5%; ∗∗1%.
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The model retained four variables – government subsidies between 2000 and 2004, pro-
cess innovation, restricted access to technologies and total sales 2004 (log). The probability
of abandoning innovation is positively and significantly affected by government subsidies
and restricted access to upstream technology at 1% level of significance, and total sales at
5% level of significance. Being a process innovator and total sales (log) affect negatively and
significantly the probability of abandoning innovation projects at 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively.Q5
The result on Restricted access is also supported by descriptive data gathered in the survey,
contained in Table 2. Firms repeatedly iterated the problems of contractual difficulties that
pointed to transaction cost issues that arise especially in transnational contexts (Indian firms
need to license research tools from foreign firms). In addition to the problems posed by the
international nature of the transaction, this also points attention to another potential issue:
such license transactions may be failing because although they are important for the Indian
firm, they may be only of marginal importance to the foreign counterpart who holds the
patent. Firm executives also confirmed abandoning research projects where there were too
many existing patents, a finding that is in line with both the US and German surveys. At the
same time, executives also admitted to the difficulties in branching out to specific areas of
research because of the problems of obtaining licenses or of too many existing patents that
discourage innovation plans, thus clearly emphasizing the issues for firms in technology
follower countries trying to expand innovative capabilities and knowledge bases.Q6
Several firms in groups 1 and 2 that face difficulties in forging good technological alliances
with firms abroad tend to rely on abandoning innovation but also simultaneously grope for
support within the system, especially in terms of governmental incentives, in order to expand
their innovation activities and survive. This explains the result on governmental subsidies
and the probability of abandoning innovation projects in the model.
Being a process innovator is negative and significantly associated with the probability
that a firm abandons innovation projects. Firms that rely on process innovation in the Indian
pharmaceutical sector predominantly perform generic activities, whereas firms that focus
mainly on product innovation or both on product and process innovation are those that
are trying to move away from traditional chemical synthesis into innovative niches or new
product development. Therefore, the latter group of firms faces a greater burden of securing
access to new technologies, and being a process innovator is negative and significant for
the probability of abandoning innovation.
The result on total sales (log) is striking, because it seems to suggest that firms with higher
sales abandon innovation projects, but explains the state of flux in the sector presently.
Some firms have been very successful and have had major breakthroughs albeit with less
employees. A good example is Matrix Laboratories, which rose very fast between 2000 and
2005 as a result of its success in developing innovative alternate processes for production
of active pharmaceutical ingredients. However, such firms are curtailed by the low general
manpower and other infrastructure from pursuing negotiation and licensing activities, and
are also more prone to sudden shocks.64 This contrasts the result that firms with higher
total employment (log) in 2004 are more unlikely to abandon innovation projects. Firms
with higher total employment (2004) are some of the most sophisticated firms in the sector,
and they have grown consistently over time with higher total employment being directly
proportional to higher sales. They not only have very good IPR departments and several
hundred people employed within them, but they also have the resources to conduct trans-
border transactions/negotiations effectively in cases where the technology in question is
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Table 5. Marginal effects on the probability of abandoning
innovation projects: restricted model
Variable Slope (Std. Err.)
Gvt. Subsid 2000–2004 0.371∗∗ (0.127)
Employment in 2004 (in log) −0.138† (0.071)
Process innovators −0.202∗ (0.100)
Restricted access to tech. 0.321∗∗ (0.095)
Total sales in 2004 (in log) 0.117∗ (0.058)
Significance levels: †10%; ∗5%; ∗∗1%.
very important.65 They are also in a series of collaborative research ventures with global Q7
pharmaceutical firms,66 and possess bargaining power and strategic assets that could interest
their global partners. Another explanation for the contrasting results of these two variables
is that the propensity to innovate comes from declining profits. Firms that are threatened by
a loss of sales or loss of profit (which is especially difficult to withstand if the firm size is
large) are driven to seek newer innovation venues.
4.2.1. Marginal effects.
Since the coefficients in Table 4 do not measure the sensitivity of the outcome (probability
of abandoning innovation projects) being 1 with respect to changes in explanatory variables
i and x, it is important to calculate the marginal effects that measure this sensitivity. Table 5 Q8
reports the marginal effects on the probability of abandoning innovation projects. Switch-
ing from the non-subsidized to the subsidized status is associated with the probability of
abandoning innovation projects by 0.371. Similarly, increasing the difficulties in access
to upstream technology by one unit results in the probability of abandoning innovation
projects of 0.321, and increasing the likelihood of being a process innovator decreases the
probability of abandoning innovation projects by 0.202.
5. Conclusions
This paper has tried to identify reasons that call for the development of more comprehen-
sive frameworks as well as collect more systematic data to assess the impact of patents
on biomedical innovation in technology follower countries. The analysis has shown that
four sets of issues are very important in a framework that looks at the impact of the TRIPS
Agreement on biomedical innovation from a technology follower developing country per-
spective: the nature of innovation and catch-up process and the possibility that accumulated
IPR positions result in impeding access to research tools for firms in technology follower
countries, the kinds of bargaining anomalies that could result from monopolistic posi-
tions, information issues and other transaction costs in international licensing arrangements
between firms/research institutes and universities, the impact of alternative intellectual
property rights regimes (that is, a TRIPS compliant regime vs a different one) on the num-
ber of innovation projects undertaken, and lastly, the impact of differential patent policies
and institutions on knowledge flows, diffusion of innovation and habits and practices of
actors in innovation systems.
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To assess whether we have more or less the same number of projects under alternate
intellectual property rights regimes (that is, TRIPS compliant regime vs a different one),
this paper considered the earlier Indian IPR regime as a weaker alternative to the one
presently prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement, in order to assess the impact of the TRIPS-
compliant IPRs regime on choices of firms to pursue specific innovation portfolios and
the resulting impact on building innovative capabilities in biomedical sciences. All other
things being constant, the Indian case analyzed in this paper shows that patent protection
in the biomedical sector has a negative impact on the number of projects pursued under a
TRIPS compliant regime. Newer innovation projects represent opportunities for building
innovative capabilities in the biomedical sector. From a dynamic perspective, the larger
number of useful innovation projects a firm has to abandon owing to IPR restrictions, the
larger the probability that the expansion of its technological capabilities is restricted. This
requires a more detailed look and a more rigorous analysis in the coming years, as and when
more information on the Indian industry becomes available.
The model developed in the paper using empirical data from the Indian pharmaceutical
and biotechnology sector shows that among the four determinants of a firm’s probability
of abandoning useful innovation projects, restricted access to upstream technology because
of contractual difficulties is a factor that is highly significant (at 1%). The marginal effects
of each one of these variables has been calculated in the analysis, in order to see how
each variable is likely to influence a firm’s probability of abandoning innovation, and how
important IPR restrictions are, when compared to other factors that affect the building of
innovative capabilities in technology follower developing countries. This analysis reveals
that restricted access to upstream technologies as a result of contractual difficulties was the
variable that is likely to have maximum impact on a firm’s decision to abandon innovation
projects. If a firm increased its chances of high restricted access to technology by one unit,
it was likely to increase its chance of abandoning innovation by 0.320 points – this was
much more than the computed effect of other variables that affected a firm’s likelihood of
abandoning innovation projects in the Indian industry.
Given the extreme significance of a global IPR regime in facilitating technological catch-
up processes, it seems important to gather as much empirical data as possible on the subject
from countries at different stages of development. Several countries are yet to comply with
the TRIPS Agreement or are in the process of doing so and such cases may prove to be good
sources of data on assessing TRIPS vs alternate IPR regimes.67 To study this problem and
its impact systematically in developed as well as technology follower developing countries,
more unified research methodologies may be required. When existing evidence from the
USA, Germany and Switzerland, and now India, are consulted on the issue, the impact of
IPRs on biomedical innovation seems to be divergent. It appears that differences in research
methodologies (interview method vs firm-level data collection) are the main reason for
contrasting empirical evidence on this issue until now.68
The same/similar sets of patent policies and institutions can have different impacts on
knowledge flows, diffusion of innovation and habits and practices of actors in different
systems of innovation. These inter-linkages need to be assessed in country-specific contexts.
Taking the TRIPS level of intellectual property protection for granted, technology follower
countries should look at reducing the problem of restricted access through appropriate design
of patent regimes. Analysis of these inter-linkages should take into account the nuanced
relationship between patent policies on creating widespread technological interdependence
in the biomedical sector. Such technological interdependence does not necessarily have
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to be the result of policies that dictate broad patent scope. Even in regimes where patent
policy dictates that patents are granted only on fewer claims and the claims themselves
are interpreted more narrowly, there is a possibility that this generates more patents per
product/technology thereby leading to as much technological interdependence as patent
policies that construe and grant broad patent claims.69 This calls for a very sound assessment
of patent scope issues within every system of innovation. Additionally, solutions such as
extended disclosure requirements in patent laws and increased pre-grant procedures that
have been successful in inducing technological spillovers between firms in other sectors
should be considered.70
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